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WALTERS v. METROPOLITAN EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES, INC.
117 S.Ct. 660 (1997).
I.

FACTS

Metropolitan below the statutory minimum of employ8

In a Title VII case alleging retaliatory firing, the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmation of the granting of a motion to dismiss as it held that Metropolitan Education Enterprises
("Metropolitan") met Title VII's statutory definition of
"employer."The Court's decision settled a dispute among
the circuits as to the proper method of determining Title
VII applicability to employers. The method used can
determine which employers are liable under Title VII.
In 1990, Metropolitan fired Darlene Walters, shortly
after she filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") claiming that
Metropolitan discriminated against her on account of
her sex by not promoting her to the position of credit
manager. Subsequently, EEOC, as it does with a small
minority of claims of alleged discrimination,' filed suit
against Metropolitan in United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois on April 7, 1993,2 alleging
that Walters' firing was retaliation for her charge of sex
3
4
discrimination. Walters then intervened as a plaintiff.
Metropolitan moved to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, contending that the company failed
to meet the minimum number of employees to be an
"employer" subject to Title VII. 5 Section 701(b) states
"[t]he term 'employer' means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen6
dar year... Following Seventh Circuit precedent, the
District Court interpreted section 701(b) to mean that
when counting employees, "hourly and part-time workers are considered employees ...only on days when they

are either physically present or on paid leave,"7 putting

IIn 1994 EEOC made cause findings in only 2.69%
of the
charges filed, 1926 of 71,563. Moreover, in 1992, EEOC only
filed 347 substantive lawsuits. Michael Selmi, The Value of the
EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 57 Ohio ST L.J. 1, 12-16 (1996).
2Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter, 117
S.Ct. 660, 662
(1997).
3
EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter, 60 E3d
1225, 1226
(1995).
4
Walters, 117 S.Ct. at 662.
Id.
6Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253,
amended
by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
7
EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter, 864 ESupp. 71,
73
(N.D.111. 1994).
8Metropolitan, 60 E3d at 1227

ees. Rejecting the payroll method, which would count
every employee maintained on the company's payroll
during the workweek, whether or not the employee performs work on each day,9 the District Court granted the
motion to dismiss,"' and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
In order to resolve the conflicting decisions amongst the
circuits, 12 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
II.

HOLDING
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court

unanimously approved the payroll method, ' 3 which had

previously been adopted by the First and Fifth Circuits,14
of Labor.
and was favored by the EEOC and Department

Because Metropolitan satisfied the statutory definition of
employer under the payroll method, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals was reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.I'

III. ANALYSIS /APPLICATION
In Walters v. MetropolitanEducationalEnterprises,

the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether
Metropolitan qualified as an employer subject to Title
VII's statutory definition of section 701(b). The Court's
interpretation of the statute would determine the
method used to calculate the number of employees
working on "each working day" of the week.
Metropolitan's status as an "employer" subject to Title VII
hinged upon which one of the two interpretations the
Court adopted. The two methods of counting in question had support from different circuits.
The Seventh Circuit first established the "workplace"
method, advocated by Metropolitan, in Zimmerman v.

9ia

91d.
'"Walters, 117 S.Ct.
at 662.
ItMetropolitan,60 E3d at
1227.
12The Fifth Circuit approved
the payroll method in Dumas
v. Mount Vernon, 612 E2d 974, 979, n.7 (5th Cir. 1980), and the
First Circuit adopted it in Thurber uJack Reilly's, Inc., 717 E2d
633, 634-35 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1678, 80
(1984). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit adopted the
workplace method in Zimmerman v. North American Signal
Co., 704 E2d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 1983) and the Eighth Circuit
agreed in McGraw v. Warren County Oil Co., 707 E2d 990,991
(8th Cir. 1983).
13Walters, 117
S.Ct. at 664.
"Id. at 666.

North American Signal Co., stating "that the lower court
was correct in declining to count hourly paid workers as
employees for days when they were neither working nor
on paid leave"16 Although Zimmerman dealt with theAge
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the Seventh
'7
Circuit had extended the workplace method toTitle VII.
The ADEA and Title VII define "employer" nearly identically, differing only in the minimum number of employees. Under the same rationale, the Eighth Circuit also
implemented the workplace method, deciding not to
count part-time workers who did not work everyday of
the workweek.' 9
Conversely, the First and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals approved the payroll method. In the First
Circuit, the court affirmed the District Court's decision
that "the number of employees should be determined by
examining the payroll and not by counting the number
of employees who report to work." Moreover, the First
Circuit also cited cases in other district courts and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which also agreed that
"regular part-time employees are employees within the
meaning of section 2000e(b)."2' In addition to the other
circuits, the EEOC adopted the payroll method under the
ADEA and the Department of Labor adopted the payroll
method under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
22
("FMLA-).
Applying the two methods to the case at hand gives
greatly varying results. Metropolitan's workweek lasted
Monday through Friday, and the current or preceding calendar years in question were 1989 and 1990. Although
the parties stipulated that Metropolitan failed to meet
the requisite employee minimum in 1989, they differed
on whether Metropolitan qualified in 1990. The parties
stipulated that Metropolitan had 15 or more employees
on its payroll for 47 weeks in 1990, however, 15 or more
employees were compensated on each working day for
only nine weeks. 2' Therefore, under the workplace
method only those nine weeks would have counted
toward the statutory requirement, six weeks less then
the required fifteen. Under the payroll method, nine
weeks must be subtracted from the 47, wherein

704 E2d at 354.
'7
Metropolitan, 60 E3d at 1226-27. The Seventh Circuit
found dispositive that earlier precedents had established that
Title VII and ADEA shared a"common purpose." Id. at 1227 n.2.
'8Zimmerman, 704 E2d at 352.
l9McGraw, 707 E2d at 991.
20Thurber,
717 F2d at 634.
21
Id. The court cited as examples: Dumas, 612 E2d
at 979
n.7; Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 507 ESupp. 1091, 1097
(M.D. Pa. 1980); Pedreyra v. Cornell PrescriptionPharmacies,
465 ESupp. 936, 941 (D. Colo. 1979); Pascutoi v. WashburnMcReavy Mortuary,11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325, 1327
(D. Minn. 1975).
Walters, 117 S.Ct. at 663.
"Id. at 662-63.
'6Zimmerman,

Metropolitan experienced mid-week changes because in
those weeks the requisite number of employees were
not on the payroll for the whole week. However, that
leaves Metropolitan with 38 weeks to be calculated
toward Title VII's definition, easily meeting Title VII's minimum to qualify."
Writing for the majority ultimately approving the
payroll method, Justice Scalia first established that "on
any particular day, all of the individuals with whom an
employer has an employment relationship are 'employees' of that employer." This employment relationship
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)'s definition of
"employer" is more expansive than the workplace
method in that it encompasses employees who do not
receive compensation from their employer on the day at
issue. Respondent Metropolitan's position, in advocating
the use of the workplace method, was that an employer,
under § 2000e(b), "has" an employee on a certain day,
only when the employer compensates the employee on
that day, regardless of whether or not the individual in
question "is" an employee, under the same statute.
Metropolitan agreed that an uncompensated employee is
an employee in employment relationship terms, but
argued that the employer did not have that employee in
Title VII terms. EEOC, on the other hand, argued that the
test for an individual being an employee and an employer having an employee are the same, i.e. "whether the
employer has an employment relationship with the indi216
vidual on the day in question."
The Court stated "that the payroll method represents
the fair reading of the statutory language, which sets as the
criterion for the number of employees that the employer
'has' for each working day." 17 Justice Scalia acceded to
Metropolitan's point that the language of the statute could
possibly "be thought to convey the idea that the employee must actually be working on the day in question,"
because of the phrase, "have an employee for a given
working day."' But the statute cannot be construed to ask,
"[h] ow many employees were you compensating on that
day?"' 9 The Court stated that such an interpretation could
"not be derived from any possible reading of the text.""'

24

Id.
"Id. at 663.
2Id.

2d. at 664.
20

Id.

29117

S.Ct. at 664.
d. Furthermore, the Court stated:
[N]o one before us urges that interpretation of the language, which would count even salaried employees only on
days that they are actually working. Such a disposition is so
improbable and so impossible to administer (few employers
keep daily attendance records of all their salaried employees)
that Congress should be thought to have prescribed it only if
the language could bear no other meaning.
30

Moreover, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals
construction of the phrase "for each working day." The
Court of Appeals had reaffirmed its decision in the
Zimmerman case, finding its interpretation of the
phrase as "the most natural interpretation."" The Court of
Appeals adopted the Zimmerman court's reasoning,
stating that the phrase is not superfluous, because it
"looks to the number of employees physically at work on
each day of the week." Moreover, the Court of Appeals
rejected EEOC's contention that "for each working day"
referred to midweek hiring and firings because they
believed it would be too infrequent an occurrence to
merit inclusion in the statute.33 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals finding of rarity and that the mid-week interpretation of the phrase justified its inclusion. Consequently, the Court found that
the words, "for each working day" would not become
superfluous under its interpretation. They clarify the
statute by not counting employees whose
employment
34
terminated or commenced mid-week.
The Court's adoption of the payroll method expands
the reach of Title VII by making more employers subject
to its regulations and makes circumvention of this classification more difficult. Title VII's more expansive reach is
best understood by the payroll method's treatment of
different types of employees. The payroll and workplace
methods count all salaried employees for every week on
the payroll, regardless if they work every day of the week
or not." Under the workplace method, however, hourly
paid workers only count if they either work or are compensated, for a paid absence for example, for everyday of
the week. On the other hand, the payroll method
includes all hourly paid workers on the payroll for the
week, even if they had an uncompensated day in which
they did not work. Similarly, part-time workers on the
payroll count, no matter if they work a few hours a day
or only on certain days of the week. Thus, smaller businesses that rely on part-time or hourly workers are more

likely to qualify as an employer under Title VII.
In addition, using the payroll method increases the
difficulty in circumventing the regulations under Title
VII. Companies can no longer avoid coverage underTitle
VII by having one less than the minimum number of
employees required working on one day of the workweek, for instance Saturday. In order to avoid coverage,
the companies would have to resort to midweek firing
and rehiring or other forms of payroll manipulations. A
history of such manipulations would be faithfully recorded by the company in the form of its biweekly payroll
taxes to the IRS. Therefore, if contested, the issue would
have a paper trail that could be investigated.
Although neither method measures
the size of the
36
business completely accurately, the Court found that
the workplace method "would turn the coverage determination into an incredibly complex and expensive factual inquiry."7 Under the payroll method, however, all
that is needed is a simple factual inquiry of when an
employee started and ended his or her employment, as
the employee is counted toward the requirement for
everyday in between. Thus, given the contrast in cost
and facility of the two methods, Court found that
Metropolitan's argument of practical consequences was
unfounded.39
By the terms of the Civil Rights Act, this decision
impacts employers accused of discrimination based on
an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."The types of discriminatory practices include situations of hiring, firing, compensation, terms, conditions
and privileges of employment, and practices that deprive
an individual of employment opportunities or adversely
affect his or her status. Furthermore, the Court has
established uniformity between Title VII, ADEA, FMLA,
and ADA,
all of which define "employer" almost the same
41
way.
The Court's decision acknowledges that there is no
difference in the meaning of "being employed" and "hav-

31

Id.

32
33Metropolitan,60

E3d at 1228.

id.
Walters, 117 S.Ct. at 664-65.
35Zimmerman, 704 E2d at 353.
3The
respondent, Metropolitan, pointed out that " an
employee who works irregular hours, perhaps only a few days
a month, will be counted toward the 15-employee minimum
for every week in the month." Walters, 117 S.Ct. at 665. The
Court countered by citing the following examples of the awkward consequences of the workplace method:
A company that has 15 employees working for it on each
day of a 5-day workweek is covered, but if it decides to add
Saturday to its workweek with only one less than its full complement of employees, it will become exempt from coverage.
... Unsalaried employees who work the same number of hours
34

per week are counted or not counted, depending on how their
hours are scheduled. A half-time worker who works only on
mornings is counted; a half-time worker who works alternate
days is not.
Walters, 117 S.Ct. at 665.
37Id.
"Id. at 665-66.

39Id.
'0Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253,
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
41Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 253,
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994);Age Discrimination in
Employment Act § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Family and Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 261 1(4)(A)(i);Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).

ing an employee." An individual is an employee, because
of her continued employment relationship, on the one
day of the week she does not work, and is still an employee that her employer has.The fact that she is returning to
work the next week is more evidence proving the relationship continues to exist.
I.

CONCLUSION

The Court implemented the payroll method to
determine that Metropolitan fulfilled the fifteen employee threshold in 1990. By adopting the payroll method,
the Court chose a more expansive definition of "employer" under Title VII, causing a simpler evaluation that covers more employers under Title VII. Previously marginal

employers which might not have had fifteen employees
under the workplace method are now under federal
jurisdiction, thus decreasing the number of employees
who can rely solely upon state jurisdiction, depending
on the state. For example, the Virginia Human Rights Act
covers employers employing between five and fifteen
42
employees. Moreover, the decreased factual inquiry
necessary to establish an employer under Title VII may
reduce litigation costs, making it more advantageous to
the client and private lawyer. Finally, the uniform interpretation across the different federal acts facilitates cases
with multiple claims of discrimination by eliminating the
need for different factual inquiries in order to establish
coverage of employers under different acts.

Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Rajesh Prasad

Va. Code Ann. S 2.1-725(B) (1997).

